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 Phishing remains a pernicious problem for organizations. Phishing attacks are increasing 
in sophistication, which hinders the ability of cybersecurity functions to effectively defend 
against them. These attacks are becoming increasingly complex, dynamic, and multifaceted to 
evade the organizational, individual, and technical countermeasures employed in a cybersecurity 
ecosystem. Information security (ISec) phishing research and practice have provided an 
understanding of generalized phishing attacks and their subsequent defense. Yet by applying 
generalized phishing rules to these studies, it may not be sufficient to understand and defend 
escalated forms of phishing. This study seeks to develop a taxonomy of phishing to provide a 
more nuanced understanding of this phenomena. This taxonomy may assist ISec research in 
providing theoretical guidance for the understanding and defense of the various forms of 
phishing.   
                                                      
1 Daniel Pienta. dpienta@clemson.edu  
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Phishing persists as a problem for cybersecurity, as 98% of socially engineered breaches 
utilize some form of phishing, with email being the most common attack vector (Verizon 2018). 
In fact, 30% of phishing emails that bypass technical countermeasures are opened by targeted 
users and 12% of those users click on a malicious attachment or link (Verizon 2018). Typically, 
phishing messages imitate a trustworthy source and request information via some form of 
electronic communication (Wright et al. 2014; Jakobsson and Myers 2007). Phishing, when 
successfully executed, is extremely profitable for cyber criminals, with the average cost to a 
victimized mid-size company being $1.6 million dollars.  
Phishing attacks are increasing in sophistication, utilizing different payloads and 
targeting a broader range of victims and assets. For example, in an attack targeting a mass 
population, cyber criminals attacked user Gmail accounts2. This attack rifled through inbox, sent, 
and draft mail folders to propagate an email request to access a shared Google document that 
afforded access to the victim’s Google contacts and Google Drive. In a more targeted attack on 
the CEO of Facc AG, an Austrian aircraft parts manufacturer, cyber criminals used a highly 
customized email to trick the CFO into transferring an estimated $50 million US dollars into an 
undisclosed account3. This highly customized phishing attack resulted in the dismissal of both 
the CEO and CFO because they were negligent in preparing the company for such an attack. 
Although mass and specific phishing attacks are very different, defenses often fail 
because they rely on generalized phishing rules (i.e. relatively simple heuristics for how to 
identify phishing). Many practitioner phishing training programs rely on the user to 1) ensure the 
                                                      
2 From 2017: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/technology/personaltech/email-attack-hits-google-what-to-do-if-you-clicked.html 
3 Obtained from: https://www.scmagazineuk.com/aeroplane-part-maker-claims-cyber-fraud-cost-it-50-million/article/531394/. Also, it should be 
noted that attack details in these highly specialized attacks typically remain confidential to the organization. 
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email header is legitimate not impersonated 2) hover and ensure an embedded link is legitimate 
3) review the domain name for legitimacy 4) review for generic salutations 5) review for spelling 
errors, and 6) look for urgent requests for sensitive information. Cognitively, it is difficult to 
believe users can apply such sophisticated sets of rules while also performing their assigned 
work. The difficulty of applying generalized phishing rules is compounded by the sheer volume 
of dynamic phishing attacks, which rely on general rules to identify phishing messages, resulting 
in technical solution detection success rates hovering at 90% (Hong et al. 2012), thus leaving the 
organization at risk. 
Some academic studies have examined how to design phishing countermeasures such as 
training, motivation, fear appeals, and threat identification (Abbasi et al. 2015; Schuetz et al. 
2016; Wright et al. 2014; Jensen et al. 2017), as well as the tactics utilized by cyber criminals to 
craft effective phishing messages (Wright et al. 2014; Wright and Marett 2010). Often, to ensure 
ecological validity, these studies mirror generalized rules employed in the design of phishing 
training (Dodge et al. 2007; Jagatic 2007; Wright and Marett 2010; Hong 2012; Wright et al. 
2014; Wang et al. 2017). Perhaps due to the volume of messages and the dynamic evolution of 
phishing, information security research (ISec) provides limited guidance to practitioners for how 
to effectively respond to increasingly complex phishing attacks or how to contextualize 
countermeasures to prevent different types of phishing attacks.   
Developing a more nuanced understanding of phishing and how to select 
countermeasures, is important because understanding the underpinnings of different phishing 
attacks will provide theoretical guidance for how to develop defense against them. In this study, 
we begin to develop a comprehensive phishing taxonomy based on academic ISec research and 
knowledge from practice in order to offer a research agenda for future phishing studies (Table 1). 
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In doing so, we suggest that the ISec community go beyond PMT to examine novel theoretical 
mechanisms to elicit compliance with security policies. By doing so, we take a first step towards 
developing a theoretical understanding of the intricacies of the many forms of phishing and 
provide a means to evaluate the applicability of different countermeasures. 
Table 1. Key Phishing Literature 
Source Journal Theory Phishing 
Attack 
Countermeasure 
   Deployed          Stimulated  
Behavior 
Wang et al. 
(2017b) 
JAIS Overconfidence Phishing N/A Judgement Detection 
Wang et al. 
(2017a) 
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CACM N/A Targeted 
Phishing 
N/A N/A N/A 
 
Phishing 
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Phishing is a form of social engineering utilized by cyber criminals to obtain confidential 
information from an end user through the imitation of a trustworthy source (Hong 2012; Wright 
et al. 2014). Phishing attacks typically rely on electronic communications (e.g., email, sms, 
VOIP, instant messaging, etc.) that appear to be from trusted sources (e.g., financial institution, 
personal contact, etc.) to deceive the user into clicking on a malicious link or downloading a 
malicious file (Hong 2012). The majority of phishing attacks unfold in three phases: (1) 
circumventing technical cybersecurity countermeasures to deliver the deceptive electronic 
communication to the target, (2) convincing the target into taking the suggested action, and (3) 
the cybercriminal capitalizing on the delivered payload for payoff. These payoffs can take a 
number of forms, such as monetary damages, espionage, lost trade secrets, and sabotage, as 
cyber criminals involved in phishing have various nefarious goals.  
Phishing remains popular among cyber criminals for many reasons. First, phishers have 
access to low-cost tools. The Anti-Phishing Work Group reported 180,577 cyber criminals 
initiated attacks in quarter four of 2017, targeting over 348 brands, and sending out 233,613 
known, unique phishing attempts4. Such attacks are enabled by free phishing kits available to 
cyber criminals available on the light and dark web, enabling out-of-the-box opportunities to 
conduct malicious phishing campaigns (Cova et al. 2008). Second, as the payoffs from selling 
credentials and credit cards have decreased on the dark web due excess availability, cyber 
criminals have directed more attention to focused and complex phishing attacks with potential 
higher payoffs (Choo 2011). Finally, perhaps due to weak or unenforced organizational policies, 
users remain a weak link in security as an estimated 90% of data breaches result from socially 
engineered cyber-attacks (Wright et al. 2014).  
                                                      
4 Obtained from the APWG phishing trends report 4th quarter 2017. http://docs.apwg.org/reports/apwg_trends_report_q4_2017.pdf 
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To mitigate phishing attacks, security professionals and academics have developed 
generalizable, multi-tiered approaches to implementing countermeasures. These countermeasures 
operate on three levels: technical (e.g., firewalls, encryption software, blacklisting, blocking, two 
factor authentication), individual (e.g., SETA programs, training, motivation), and organizational 
(e.g., prosecution, investments, legal, policy). For instance, if a phishing email penetrates a 
technical countermeasure, an individual may rely on past training to identify the email. If the 
phishing attack is successful, an organization, upon identifying the culprit of the attack, may seek 
justice and restitution through legal means in order to deter future attacks. In developing these 
holistic defenses to phishing, many organizations rely on recommendations to use turnkey sets of 
tools and practices to tie together technology, people, processes, and information and defend 
their perimeters5.   
To circumvent increasingly sophisticated countermeasures, cyber criminals have 
designed highly complex phishing attacks that take advantage of known features of even the 
most touted defenses. Consider two factor authentication (2FA), a technical countermeasure. 
2FA provides an extra layer of security beyond a username and password, by requiring 
information pushed to a user on a device (e.g. sending a code via a cell phone). 2FA was recently 
weaponized by cyber criminals via social engineering tactics6. Cyber criminals obtain the 2FA 
session cookie by redirecting the end user to a spoofed login page where they pass credentials 
(login, password, and 2FA authentication code) through to the authentic website, thereby 
securing a session cookie and login. Note, this does not imply the technical countermeasure 
failed, rather the security breach occurs because an individual clicks on a malicious link or 
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bypass countermeasures’ features to reach users, through a more nuanced understanding of the 
different types of phishing, will afford opportunities to further refine countermeasures necessary 
to secure firm boundaries. 
In summary, phishing continues to be a pervasive danger to organizations, resulting in a 
myriad of economic losses and continuing to evolve in complexity. Efforts have been made by 
academics, practitioners, and governments to defend against phishing attacks through individual, 
technical, and organizational countermeasures, yet phishing continues to remain a potent tool for 
cyber criminals. This may be due to the continued evolution of phishing, to take advantage of 
known features of countermeasures, to target specific individuals or to integrate new methods.  
Therefore, ISec research needs to develop an updated, thorough understanding of phishing 
attacks in order to extend current theoretical understanding of this phenomenon to develop more 
effective defense of this phenomena.       
 
Phishing in ISec Literature 
ISec researchers have directed much attention to phishing, employing diverse methods 
ranging from economic modeling to psychometric analysis and field experiments. ISec 
researchers have typically sought to test, develop, and/or analyze a set of technical and individual 
countermeasures that validate their methods by detecting general phishing messages or 
evaluating their impact on known sets of security policies/steps. By doing so, ISec research seeks 
to provide advice on how to develop effective countermeasures to defend against phishing 
attacks. 
ISec research has extensively investigated technical phishing countermeasures. Abbasi et 
al. (2010) used statistical learning theory (SLT) to develop a new class of fake website detection 
systems. Through a series of experiments, this research showed that systems grounded in SLT 
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have more efficacy in detecting websites since they use a richer set of fraud cues and domain 
specific knowledge. Furthering this work, Abbasi et al. (2015) used a genre tree kernel method to 
improve detection of phishing websites by end users compared to state-of-the-art anti-phishing 
methods in practice. Additionally, Vance et al. (2014) studied users habituation and disregard to 
information systems warnings, such as the technological interjections phishing system rely upon. 
The findings suggest that over time individuals become desensitized to these warnings and 
therefore there is a need for improvements in the design of these warnings (Anderson et al. 2016; 
Vance et al. 2014).  
ISec research has also investigated phishing countermeasures from an individual 
perspective, looking at how training, influence tactics, and motivation, among others, affect users 
ability and intention to identify, detect, and protect confidential information (Schuetz et al. 2016; 
Wright et al. 2014; Wright and Marett 2010). For instance, Wright et al. (2014), through a field 
experiment, studied the effects of influence tactics employed by cyber criminals in phishing. 
This research extended theoretical understanding of persuasion and motivation theories, in the 
context of phishing, by identifying which persuasive tactics were most efficacious in a 
successfully phishing attack. At the same time, this research provided guidelines for 
cybersecurity departments to defend these attacks by noting the use of these tactics in phishing 
emails. The practical impact of this work can be seen in online corporate training providers, like 
LawRoom, where they are now incorporating influence techniques into training modules.  
ISec phishing research has directed attention to phishing countermeasures from an 
organizational perspective. Dey et al. (2014) looked at various forms of cybersecurity software, 
including anti-phishing, and found that network effects work as a counterweight, which provides 
vendors incentive to collocate at the top end of the quality spectrum. This provides vendors a 
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reason to not differentiate their product and move anti-phishing software forward, since they do 
not receive a monetary incentive. This shows that organizations need to be strategic in their 
choice of anti-phishing software, as differentiation may not be a driving factor since most 
software is geared toward mass attacks rather than targeted attacks. Benaroch and Chernobai 
(2017) found the importance board level governance plays in the number of operational IT 
failures. This research demonstrated that organizational countermeasures, such a governance, 
influence defense against IT operational failures, such as the loss of confidential information due 
to phishing (Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017).   
ISec research has also studied general defense strategies relevant to phishing. For 
instance, behavioral researchers have studied protection motivation theory and its effect on 
individual motivation behavioral to protect information assets (Boss et al. 2015; Johnston et al. 
2015; Johnston and Warkentin, 2010). ISec researchers have also studied the effects of 
government mandates (Png et al. 2008), enforcement (Willison and Warkentin 2013) and 
vulnerability disclosure and attack diffusion (Mitra and Ransbotham 2015), among others. 
Although, these streams are not specifically contextualized to phishing they provide insight into 
the problem and its defense. 
 
Phishing in Practice 
Despite academic research, phishing remains a persistent noxious problem in practice. 
Many cybersecurity companies offer anti-phishing tools. For example, most email systems build 
in phishing countermeasures, such as blocking and filtering mechanisms, that remove access to 
malicious emails and websites. Despite such measures, practitioners note that the majority of 
employees remain ill prepared to identify an attack and lack general knowledge of cybersecurity 
(Olmstead and Smith 2017).  
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In contrast to ISec research, which primarily studies phishing, in general (Abbasi et al. 
2015, 2010; Dey et al. 2014; Wright and Marett, 2010), or spear phishing, in particular (Jensen et 
al. 2017; Schuetz et al. 2016; Wright et al. 2014), practitioner literature focuses on delineating 
features of, and methods to defend against, novel forms of phishing attacks, as each attack entails 
different levels of complexity and targets (Rashid 2017, Brecht 2018). They do so, because in 
order to inoculate users against their effects, practitioners feel they must be able to describe their 
key features and their potential impact on the organization 
Practitioners primarily note the following forms: (1) pharming (2) phishing (3) spear 
phishing (4) clone phishing, and (5) whaling (Table 2). Pharming refers to the practice of 
directing internet users to a bogus website that mimics a legitimate one to harvest confidential 
information. Phishing refers to attempts to acquire confidential information from a mass group of 
people by masquerading as a trustworthy source. Spear phishing refers to attempts directed at 
specific individuals within a group using personal information as a means to increase success. 
Clone phishing refers to replicating a legitimate email and replacing the link or file with a 
malicious version. Whaling attacks are directed specifically at senior executives or other high 
profile targets within a business by using highly customized threat intelligence7. These forms 
represent broad categories, and there is a need to develop crisper descriptions and gather details 
of specific attacks, in order to understand the rate at which they occur and their impact on 
organizations. 
Although the practitioner literature classifies general forms of phishing attacks, it lacks 
precision necessary to clearly provide a universal understanding of attack characteristics. For 
example, to a layman, spear phishing may be indistinguishable from clone phishing, leading to 
                                                      
7 Obtained from general descriptions from phishing defense software providers and practitioner literature:  
https://www.phishingbox.com/news/phishing-news/types-of-phishing-defined, https://www.csoonline.com/article/3234716/phishing/types-of-
phishing-attacks-and-how-to-identify-them.html , https://www.antiphishing.org  
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confusion among end users about what cues to look for to defend against or a lack of 
understanding of the implications of responding to one of these ubiquitous persistent threats 
(Schuetz et al. 2016). A more precise understanding of the different characteristics leading to a 
classification of the various forms of phishing attacks may provide insight into improving current 
technical, individual, and organizational phishing defenses. 
 
PHISHING TAXONOMY 
 In this section, we offer a taxonomy to classify phishing attacks based on ISec research 
and the practitioner literature. Because ISec research has primarily focused on general phishing 
and spear phishing, we relied more on the practitioner literature to describe pharming, clone 
phishing and whaling. 
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While ISec has a rich tradition of examining phishing attacks, their sources, and their 
remedies, our study suggests that ISec research has left relatively unexamined important forms of 
phishing. The majority of ISec research directs attention to individual countermeasures, such as 
training or motivation, designed to mitigate generalized phishing attacks such as pharming, 
phishing, or spear-phishing. While our review is preliminary, we believe it suggests several 
opportunities for future phishing research to address emergent forms of phishing such as cloning 
and whaling. (Table 3).  
First, consistent with recent calls for contextualized theory in the broader IS discipline 
(Hong et al. 2014), we believe there is a pressing need for developing context-specific theories 
that provide a more nuanced understanding of different forms of phishing. Such theory 
development is important, as it may reveal missing relationships and actionable advice for 
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designing phishing countermeasures. A nuanced understanding of phishing may shed light on 
when generalized countermeasures are effective (e.g., basic phishing messages), or when firms 
need to exert more effort to combat specific forms of phishing (e.g., whaling). Further 
contextualizing existing theories such as PMT may help move ISec research and practice 
forward in helping to understand how to defend and diffuse different forms of phishing attacks 
through more contextualized theoretical understanding.  
Second, the majority of current research in phishing focuses on an individual, technical, 
or organization countermeasures in isolation. For example, most approaches that utilize PMT 
elicit the individual countermeasure of motivation, but absent ability, motivation may not help 
defend against sophisticated phishing attacks. We believe there is a pressing need for 
understanding the impact of the intertwinement between different forms of countermeasures, in 
terms of awareness and access, in shaping user motivation and actual compliance with security 
policies, particularly for less common, targeted attacks such as whaling.  
Third, the majority of phishing field experiments take place during a relatively short 
amount of time, such as one month, a single-shot exercise, or within a lab environment. In 
reality, the cybersecurity function of an organization might not have such serendipitous timing, 
when implementing training, because waiting to send fear inducing warnings, or calls for user 
action, may result in security breaches. Extended longitudinal research is needed to assess the 
impact of consistent, sustained security policies vis a vis reactive, emergency interventions. This 
is particularly important, if we are to understand how to combat recurring (e.g., pharming and 
spear phishing) as well as episodic threats (e.g., whaling or cloning).     
Fourth, there is limited understanding of organizational countermeasures in relation to 
phishing such as governance, auditing, and policy. Studying the role organizational 
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countermeasures may play in the different types of phishing attacks could provide insight into 
how these countermeasures cross organization boundaries. For instance, many organizations 
have layers of safeguard policies in place to prevent whaling attacks. In many of these attacks, 
that seek substantial payouts, there is a chain of command protocol in regards to transferring 
large financial sums. Yet despite such risks, cyber criminals continue to elicit responses from 
well-placed employees who ignore these human-based protocols and countermeasures.   
Lastly, combining theoretical perspectives may shed light on how to effectively design 
countermeasures (individual, organizational, and technical) and responses to the myriad forms of 
phishing. For example, in a whaling attack would a more finite understanding of the process used 
to gather highly customized content provide insight into defenses and subsequent responses to 
eradicate this phase of the attack? Cloning also relies on highly astute monitoring of networks by 
cyber criminals typically through the monitoring of multiple email accounts until an action 
triggers the opportunity to attack. Many of these attacks are carried out through legitimate emails 
that have been compromised and links are masked within PDF’s and other forms that technical 
countermeasures cannot scan. So extending and combining theory to pre-breach, during breach, 
and post-breach phases of attack cycles could provide more nuanced understanding of these 
diverse forms of phishing. 
Table 3. Future Phishing Research Directions 
Direction Action Benefit 
Context Specific Theory Inclusion of multiple forms of 
phishing 
Understanding of the robustness of 
the proposed theoretical defense 
Countermeasure Intertwinement Inclusion of multiple 
countermeasures 
Understanding of the interaction of 
different countermeasures 
Countermeasure Saliency Extended longitudinal studies Understanding of the sustained 
effects of countermeasures 
Organizational Countermeasures Increased organizational level 
studies 
Understanding of the organizational 
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